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FOREIGN SALES CORPORATIONS: A VIABLE
SOLUTION TO THE DISC CONTROVERSY?
I. INTRODUCTION

The Foreign Sales Corporation Act of 1983 (FSC)1 was introduced in Congress on August 4, 1983 as a replacement for the
embattled ten year old tax export aid, the Domestic International
Sales Corporation (DISC). 2 Given the criticism which has plagued
DISC since its inception in 1971, this year's enactment of FSC is
indeed a welcome change. However, as a solution to the DISC controversy under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), 3 or as a comparable incentive to DISC, FSC is arguably
somewhat lacking.
1. The Foreign Sales Corporation Act of 1983, H.R. 3810, was originally introduced
in the House of Messers. Rostenkowski and Conable on August 4, 1983. H.R. 3810, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H6606 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1983). An identical Senate bill, S. 1804, was
introduced the same day by Senator Dole. S. 1804, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC.
S11762 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1983 pt. II). Neither version received consideration during the 98th
Congress 1st session. On March 21, 1984, however, FSC was reported out of the Senate
Committee on Finance as a part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, H.R. 4170. See Summary of Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, reprinted in 23 TAX NOTES (CCH) No. 2, at 178 (Apr.
9, 1984). Although not made a part of the House tax act, FSC was passed by the Senate
on May 17, 1984. 130 CONG. REC. S5973 (daily ed. May 17, 1984). In conference, FSC was adopted
by both Senate and House conferees on Saturday, June 23, 1984, and the Conference Report
was passed by both houses on June 27, 1984. 130 CONG. REC. D902, D905 (daily ed. June 27,
1984). President Reagan signed the tax bill into law on July 18, 1984. 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1037 (July 23, 1984).
2. A Domestic International Sales Corporation is a tax incentive to export. See 26
U.S.C. §§ 991-997 (1982). As a long term direct tax deferral, DISC works by lowering the
effective tax rate on export transactions. In 1976, the DISC provisions were challenged and
found incompatible with the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT), done Oct.
30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3 (1947), T.l.A.S. No. 1700, 55-61 U.N.T.S. 194 (1948). See Report of the
GATT Panel, United States Tax Legislation (DISC), GATT DOC L./4422 (2 Nov. 1976),
reprinted in 23 BISD 98 (1975-76).
3. GATT, supra note 2. The concern in the debate over DISC compliance with GATT
centered on whether DISC violated GATT article XVI on subsidies. GATT, supra note 2,
at A51, as then interpreted by the Working Party Report on Subsidies. See Report on Subsidies, Provisions of article XVI:4, reprinted in 9 BISD 185 (1961). The EC alleged that DISC
was a "remission of direct taxes, ... calculated in relation to exports" that was specifically
defined as a subsidy under items (c) and (d) of the Working Party Report. Report on Subsidies, 9 BISD at 186-187. The United States argued DISC was not an exemption or remission, but rather only a deferral and therefore GATT legal. In relation to FSC, then, one
issue is whether FSC is a subsidy under the now official Subsidies Code, the successor to
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Under. certain circumstances, to be discussed, FSC may conform to the legal standards of GATT. 4 These circumstances,
however, are not the majority of cases. Perhaps even more
troublesome is that Congressional approval of FSC publicly signifies
a retreat from longstanding U.S. efforts to combat the trade distorting tax practices of the European Community (EC). 5 Not only
does FSC concede the direct-indirect exemption conflict to European logic, 6 but it represents a unilateral effort at enforced arm'slength pricing currently unmatched in the EC. 7
As an export incentive to producers, FSC offers a net level
of benefit lower than that under DISC 8 with more inherently costly
requirements. 9 Because of this added cost, the proposal may well
be out of reach of many of the businesses it was intended to aid. 10
Moreover, with such low or negative levels of would-be benefits
the Working Party Report. See GATT: Agreement on Interpretation of Articles VI, XVI
and XXIII, done, Apr. 12, 1979 (1979) 1 U.S.T. 573, T.l.A.S. No. 9619, reprinted in 26 BISD
56 (1979) [hereinafter cited to BISD]. For reasons discussed herein, FSC has the potential
to be a subsidy. See infra text accompanying notes 163-85a.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 163-85a. Under the model derived in footnotes
174-84, for FSC to be consistent with the GA TT foreign economic processes exemption, see
infra text accompanying notes 87-88, it would have to be assumed that the disposition and
overhead costs incurred by an FSC represented 64% of the export price of the product.
Clearly, if the FSC does not produce the product itself, but rather must purchase it at arm'slength from its parent, a mere 36% of the export price being allocable to the product itself
is somewhat unrealistic. Moreover, given the "watered down" foreign process and presence
requirements under the FSC proposal, it is equally unrealistic that the costs for these
processes would amount to 64% of the export selling price. However, these are the assumptions arguably made by the drafters of H.R. 3810.
5. Reference is made to the longstanding U.S. policy of promoting free, undistorted
trade patterns based on comparative advantage. FSC arguably does not further this policy
because of its questionable GATT legality. Moreover, FSC represents both an abandonment
of the U.S. fight to win recognition of indirect tax exemptions as trade distorting practices
within the meaning of the GATT, as well as a move toward arm's-length transfer pricing
which is currently unmatched in Europe. Thus, not only do indirect exemptions remain GATT
legal, but EC transfer price rules have yet to match U.S. arm's-length standards-both trade
distorting results. See infra text accompanying notes 208-32.
6. See supra note 4 and infra text accompanying notes 208-32.
7. See supra note 4 and infra text accompanying notes 73-86.
8. While DISC and FSC, in the large exporter case, offer the same level of tax benefit,
with the costly foreign presence and process requirements of FSC, the net level of benefit
under FSC is lower. See infra text accompanying notes 232-47.
9. These more costly requirements are called the foreign presence and foreign
economic processes requirements. See infra text accompanying notes 109-25.
10. This conclusion is drawn from the fact that because the effective level of tax benefit
is lower under FSC than under DISC, those firms operating at the margin under DISC would
find it too costly to continue to produce in the United States and export through a foreign
subsidiary. See infra text accompanying notes 242-47.
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in some cases, FSC may be a force in granting marginal DISC users
an incentive to once again invest and produce abroad. 11
FSC may buy a short term peace with the EC in the GA TT
Council. The long run effect, however, is a net disadvantage to U.S.
exporters in relation to their European counterparts and a further
entrenchment of the trade distorting practices of the EC's own tax
export aids. It appears, therefore, that while United States' efforts
may be commendable, there is something indeed ironic about calling FSC a real "solution" to anything.
An analysis of the arguments presented above is the subject
of this Note. Section II will deal with the DISC legislation, its
technical and theoretical description, and the history of the DISC
controversy within GATT. 11a Particular emphasis will be placed on
the justification for DISC the United States offered and then abandoned before the GA TT CounciI. 11h Section III will deal with the FSC
Proposal. 11 c Section IV is an analysis ofFSC legality under GATT and
its acceptability to business as an alternative incentive to DISC. 11d

II. DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL SALES CORPORATIONS
A. A TECHNICAL/THEORETICAL DESCRIPTION
A Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) is an
exporting firm located in the United States that is exempt from
federal income taxation. 12 Enacted as a part of the Revenue Act
of 1971,13 DISC is designed to give parent corporations with DISC
subsidiaries a lower effective tax rate on the export income from
domestically produced goods. 14 The purpose of the lower rate is to
11. Reference is made to one of the policies for which DISC was created: to keep taxes
from creating an incentive to produce goods for foreign markets in foreign countries rather
than in the United States. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., lsT
SESS., REPLACEMENT OF DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL SALES CORPORATIONS (DISCs)-DESCRIPTION
OF s. 1804 (FOREIGN SALES CORPORATION ACT) 34 (J. Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter cited as
Joint Committee Print]. Whereas FSC does not provide the same net level of benefit as
DISC, those firms at the margin will find a net advantage in producing abroad rather than
in the United States.
lla. See infra notes 12-100 and accompanying text.
llb. See infra notes 73-86 and accompanying text.
llc. See infra notes 101-62 and accompanying text.
lld. See infra notes 163-263 and accompanying text.
12. 26 u.s.c. §§ 991-92 (1982).
13. The Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, Title V, § 501, 85 Stat. 535 (1971).
14. Joint Committee Print, supra note 11, at 9.
The lower effective tax rate on the export income earned through DISCs is based on
the assumption of permanent DISC deferral. If, for instance, all deferred income needed
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counter existing corporate tax incentives for producing abroad such
as paying no U.S. tax until the foreign income is repatriated. 15 By
producing at home, it was hoped that there would be a positive
effect on U.S. balance of payments and the level of domestic
em ployment. 16
In theory, the desired effects of the DISC legislation are
achieved by lowering the effective income tax rate to give the DISC
exporter the opportunity to lower prices, expend more funds on
export promotion, and thereby increase the demand for exports. 17
With the increased profitability of exporting, there would then be
a shift of firms and their resources to the exporting industry, which
in turn would result in a higher number of exports. 18 By making
to be set aside for future tax liability, the isolation of these funds and their lack of productivity in the production process would arguably make up for any lower effective tax rate.
In reality, firms behave with the deferred income tax dollars as if they were the result of
a tax exemption. Accordingly, the Accounting Principles Board advises that, "the contingent
tax liability [related to _DISC tax-deferred income] is so remote that it need not even be
considered in the compilation of annual earnings." Statement of Accounting Principles Board,
reprinted in Anninger, DISC and GATT: International Trade Aspects of Bringing Deferral
Home, 13 HARV. INT'L L.J. 391, 404 (1972).
15. The Committee analyzed the effect of the disparate tax treatment given U.S.
companies which exported goods abroad and U.S. companies which manufactured
goods abroad in foreign subsidiaries, as follows: The exporter was discriminated
against because he paid full U.S. taxes on a· current basis; the U.S. company which
manufactured abroad through a foreign subsidiary, on the other hand, generally
was required to pay only the foreign taxes on its income on a current basis. Foreign
taxes were found by the committee to average about 10 percentage points less
than the regular U.S. corporate income tax. The committee also found that the
existing tax structure encouraged the reinvestment of foreign earnings of foreign
subsidiaries in plants or selling organizations located abroad, since this enabled
the parent corporation to postpone the payment of the U.S. tax which would result
if the foreign earnings were remitted to the United States. The DISC provisions
of the bill were designed to remove the U.S. exporter's disadvantage by freeing
him from U.S. tax as long as he continued to use export income in production
facilities, to the extent the facilities were used to produce goods in the U.S. for
sales abroad.
Joint Committee Print, supra note 11, at 9.
16. Id.
17. Comment, The DISC Legislation as a Violation of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, 41 Mo. L. REV. 180, 185 (1976).
18. Id. at 186. Traditional microeconomic theory predicts that in industries where short
run influences create excess economic profits, firms in industries facing long run equilibrium
and zero economic profits will be drawn to investing resources at the higher return. Once
a greater number of firms develop in the industry with the higher asset returns, output
will expand, prices will fall, and excess profits will dissipate in the long run thereby limiting
the expanding industry's growth. The result, therefore, is the long run expansion of the
targeted industry.
In the DISC case, the lower effective tax rate creates excess economic profits which
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it as profitable to have a manufacturing subsidiary based in the
United States as abroad, the tax deferral increases the demand for
the domestically produced product. 19
To qualify as a DISC and receive this favorable tax treatment,
a corporation must meet several requirements: (1) the DISC must
be incorporated in the United States; 20 (2) it must have issued only
one class of stock with a stated value of at least $2,500.00; 21 (3) it
must have elected to be treated as a DISC; 22 (4) ninety-five percent
of its gross receipts must be derived from exports; 23 and (5) ninetyfive percent of its assets must be export related. 24
A DISC may act as a principal or as an agent with respect to
export property. 25 Its activities can be performed for or on behalf
of related or unrelated parties. 26 There is also no requirement for
attract entry into the targeted export sector. This creates a greater output of the export
good, a new lower price for the export good, and an expansion in the quantity of exports
demanded. Under competitive market conditions, this is an export tax incentive. For further explanation, see w. NICHOLSON' MICRO ECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 291-307 (2d ed. 1978).
19. Comment, supra note 15, at 186. The reference to making production "just as
profitable" at home as abroad is in reference to tax incidence alone. The analysis in the
text accompanying notes 17-19'is one which holds all other factors besides tax rate constant for the predicted result. Under DISC, the "just as profitable" language refers to the
existence of a U.S. based export firm which is itself tax exempt and whose dividends are
only taxed to the parent stock owner when distributed. This immediate tax scheme is that
which is currently in place for export firms based abroad, owned by U.S. based corporations.
20. 26 U.S.C. § 992(a)(l) (1982).
21. Id. § 992(aXl)(c).
22. Id. § 992(aXl)(D).
23. Id. § 992(aXl)(A). The gross receipts test requires that at least 95% of the
corporation's gross receipts consist of qualified export receipts. In general, qualified export
receipts are receipts, including commission receipts,•derived from the sale or lease for use
outside of the United States of export property, Id. § 993(a)(l)(A), or from the furnishing
of services related or subsidiary to the sale or lease of export property. Id. § 993(a)(l)(C).
Dividends on stock of related foreign export corporations and interest on any obligation
which is a qualified export asset are also considered qualified export receipts. Id. § 993(aX1XE).
Export property must be manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted in the United States.
Exports subsidized by the U.S. government or exports intended for ultimate use in the United
States do not qualify as export property. Id. § 993(aX2). A DISC may not engage in manufacturing, producing, growing or extracting export property. Id. § 993(c)(l)(A).
24. Qualified export related assets include inventories of export property, necessary
operational equipment and supplies, trade receivables from export sales (including commissions receivable), producer's loans, working capital, investments in related foreign export
corporations, obligations of domestic corporations organized solely to finance export sales
under guaranty agreements with the Export-Import Bank, and obligations issued, guaranteed
or insured by the Export-Import Bank or the Foreign Credit Association. Id. § 992(a)(l)(B).
25. Statement by Reagan Administration, General Explanation of Current Law-DISC,
reprinted in 20 TAX NOTES (CCH) No. 3, at 240 (June 18, 1983).
26. Id.
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a DISC to have employees or real operation. 27 Conversely, the DISC
itself is prohibited from producing the exports it sells. 28
The size of the DISC benefit a parent corporation or
shareholder receives is dependent in major part upon two factors:
the amount of export income allocated to the tax exempt entity from
the parent; 29 and the portion of the taxable DISC income that is
required to be distributed back to the parent. 30 DISC income allocation is determined either on an "arm's-length" 31 basis or under one
of two special pricing rules. 32 Specifically, an allocation can be made
allowing the DISC to earn taxable income not exceeding the greater
of:
a. taxable income based upon the price actually charged the DISC
by its supplier, if that price is justifiable under section 482 pricing
regulations; 33
b. four percent of the qualified export receipts attributable to the
sale of export property plus 10% of the related export promotion
expenses, which are the ordinary and necessary expenses incurred
to obtain qualified export receipts; 34 or
c. fifty percent of the combined taxable income of the DISC and
its related supplier attributable to qualified export receipts plus
10% of the related export promotion expenses. 35

In terms of the portion of DISC income that is distributed, the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determines the parent's tax liability in the following manner. Using the DISC's average gross receipts
27. Id.
28. Id. See 26 U.S.C. § 993(c)(l)(A) (1982). See also Anninger, DISC and GATT: International Trade Aspects of Bringing Deferral Home, 13 HARV. INT'L L.J. 391 (1972).
29. This is the intercompany transfer provision defined at 26 U.S.C. § 994 (1982).
Theoretically, the parent desires to allocate as much income as possible to the DISC in order
to decrease its own tax base and increase the DISC's. This is achieved by charging as low
a price as possible to the DISC for goods to be sold for export. Under the DISC provisions,
this occurs through the choice of the transfer price rule which allocates the greatest amount
of total export receipts to the DISC.
30. This is the distribution requirement for DISC shareholders defined at 26 U.S.C.
§ 995 (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 36-38.
31. "Arm's-length" refers to a transfer price between two related entities which is
theoretically equal to that price which would be charged for the same good between unrelated
parties. It is a standard which related U.S. tax payers are required to follow or else face
reallocation by the IRS under § 482. 26 U.S.C. § 482 (1982).
32. Id. § 994(a)(l) & (a)(2).
33. Id. § 994(a)(3).
34. Id. § 994(a)(l).
35. Id. § 994(a)(2).
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over a four year base period, the excess of the current year's
receipts over 67% of the average gross is calculated. 36 Fifty-seven
and a half percent of the excess is deemed distributed to the DISC's
shareholders and is taxed to the parent corporation or individual
at the normal rate. 37 The remaining 42.5% is retained by the DISC
and is exempt from taxation. 38
Since 1971, the DISC provisions have been altered by the Tax
Reduction Act of 1975,39 the Tax Reform Act of 197640 and the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA). 41 The Tax
Reduction Act denied DISC benefits to profits arising from exports
of products in short domestic supply .42 The 1975 Act also removed
DISC benefits from exports of natural resource products, such as
oil, gas, and minerals, subject to the percentage depletion
allowance. 43 The Tax Reform Act excluded renewable resources,
36. Id. § 995(e)(3).
37. Id. § 291(a)(4).
38. Id. These provisions for the calculation of DISC income distribution and deferral
are appropriately referred to as the "incremental provisions." See infra text accompanying
notes 45-46. Their purpose is to ensure that only by increasing exports will firms increase
their DISC benefits past the first year of election.
To understand this incremental concept, the use of a simplifying example is perhaps
best. If a DISC, in operation, say, since 1971 were to calculate its distribution and deferral
for 1980, it would first calculate an average base period figure using the fourth, fifth, sixth
and seventh calendar years preceding 1980. Thus, the base period figure would be the average
of export receipts for years 1974 through 1977. For simplicity, this amount will be $162 ($75
+ $150 + $200 + $225 I 4).
Using this ngure of $162 as the average gross receipts base, the excess of the 1980 figure
over 67% of the base is calculated. For 1980, a gross receipts amount of $400 will be chosen
to provide a contrast for our example. Thus, for the hypothetical DISC in 1980, receipts in excess
of 67% of the base are $291. Under the distribution rules, $167 ($291 x .575) would be deemed
distributed to the parent (provided the DISC is a wholly owned subsidiary) and $124 ($291 x .425)
would be income retained by the DISC as tax exempt deferred income.
Suppose, however, this DISC had a higher base average, reflecting a lesser export receipts
increase for 1980. Using a base of $294 ($225 + $275 + $325 + $350), the receipts in excess
of 67% of the base would be $203. Distribution would then be $117 to the parent with only $86
for the DISC tax free as a deferral. Clearly, the example illustrates that the absolute level of DISC
receipts is not as significant as the relationship of gross receipts to the base period average. Thus,
the conclusion is consistent with the incremental rule's purpose: only by increasing current export
receipts can DISC benefits increase. As parent corporations wish to increase DISC benefits,
they must not maintain their current level of exports, they must increase it. From the firm's
viewpoint, this is the incentive to export.
39. Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, Title VI,§ 603, 89 Stat. 26, 64 (1975).
40. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, Title XI, § 1101, 90 Stat. 1520, 1655
(1976).
41. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, Title II, §
204(a), 96 Stat. 324, 423 (1982).
42. 26 U.S.C. § 993(c)(3) (1982).
43. Id. § 993(c)(2)(C).
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such as timber, from the natural resource products ineligible for
DISC benefits. 44 The 1976 Act also included incremental provisions
limiting DISC benefits to increases in exports above a certain base
period. 45 The incremental provisions were enacted in order to ensure
DISC benefits were perpetuated only as a result of increased
exports. 46 In 1982, TEFRA increased the deemed distribution rate
from a DISC to a corporate shareholder from 50% to 57.5% of taxable income. 47
Based on the foregoing, the real value of DISC benefits is
perhaps somewhat hidden. 48 Clearly, regardless whether income
becomes tax exempt when retained by the DISC, it is still of little
use to the parent or stockholder if it is taxed at the full rate when
distributed. 49 Moreover, if the income cannot be used for production by the DISC, even the DISC's tax exempt status is arguably
of little value. 50 The law, however, permits the DISC to loan its tax
exempt profits to the parent or related firm if such firm is itself
substantially engaged in export activities. 51 Herein lies the
mechanism by which the parent firm can productively utilize the
tax benefits so seemingly valueless to the DISC itself as a paper
corporation. 52 Very simply, the more income allocated to the DISC,
the greater the amount of tax exempt DISC income available for
low interest "producer loans" to the parent, and the greater the
incentive to produce and sell abroad.
B. DISC AND GATT: A HISTORY OF CONTROVERSY

Ever since its conception in 1970, DISC has been· the topic of
heated debate. 53 Of primary concern in this debate have been the
44. Tax Reform Act of 1976, supra note 40, at 60.
45. Tax Reform Act of 1976, supra note 40, at 1655.
46. Joint Committee Print, supra note 11, at 13-14. Under the incremental approach,
deferral is only granted to the extent of 42.5% of a company's current income attributable
to increases in its exports over 67% of a 4 year average base amount. See also note 38.
47. 26 U.S.C. § 291(a)(4) (1982).
48. See generally, Brumbaugh, DISC: Effects, Issues, and Proposed Replacements, Congressional Research Service, Apr. 5, 1983, Rpt. No. 83-69E, 5-6.
49. Outside of deemed distributions, any declared dividends by DISCs are also subject to full taxation for the shareholder. 26 U.S.C. § 995(a) (1982).
50. Recall discussion of § 993(c)(l)(A), supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
51. 26 u.s.c. § 993(d) (1982).
52. Brumbaugh, supra note 48, at 5.
53. See Summary of arguments against DISC proposed by S. Surrey, Hearings on
Amendments 925 and 1009 to H.R. 175520 Before the Senate Commi ttee on Finance, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. I, 37, 43-44 (1970). See also Brown, Slipped DISC, FORBES, Oct. 10, 1983, 158;
J.H. Jackson, The Jurisprudence of International Trade: The DISC Case in Catt, 72(4) AM.
J. lNT'L L. 747, 750-51 (1978); T. Kwako, Tax Incentives for Exports, Permissible and Proscribed:
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repeated allegations of Canada and the EC that DISC is an export
subsidy illegal under GATT. 54 In response, the United States has
consistently argued that DISC is not an illegal subsidy under GATT
but merely a tax deferral which is justifiable as a provision to
neutralize the export subsidies inherent in certain European tax
systems. 55
An Analysis of the Corporate Income Tax Implications of the MTA Subsidies Code, 12(3)
LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 677, 686-714 (1980).
54. See United States Tax Legislation (DISC), Report of the Panel, supra note 2, at 102.
55. Id. For a clear picture of the U.S. position before the GATT Council, the following
excerpt from a letter by Roy T. Englert, Acting General Counsel, U.S. Department of State,
to Hon. Wilbur D. Mills, Chairman, House Committee on Ways and Means is representative:
Dear Mr. Chairman: At the presentation before the Ways and Means Committee by the Treasury of its proposal for a domestic international sales corporation (DISC) on May 12, 1970, it was requested that the Committee be furnished
with an opinion as to the compatibility of the DISC proposal with the obligations
of the United States under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
The pertinent provision of the GATT is Article XVI:4. That Article provides
in part as follows:
" ... from 1January1958 or the earliest practicable date thereafter, contracting
parties shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly any form of subsidy on
the export of any product other than a primary product which subsidy results in
the sale of such product for export at a price lower than the comparable price
charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic market ...."
Thus, the DISC proposal would be inconsistent with the obligations of the
United States under the GATT only if that proposal involved the granting of a
subsidy and the subsidy would result in the sale of products for export at a price
lower than the comparable price in the domestic market.
The GATT working Party on Subsidies of November 19, 1960 (BISD, 9th Supp.,
Geneva, 1961) issued a report which, at page 185, sets forth a list of practices which
would constitute a subsidy within the meaning of Article XVI:4, including the "exemption in respect to exported goods, of charges or taxes, other than ... indirect
taxes" and the "remission, calculated in relation to exports, of direct taxes ...
on industrial or commercial enterprises."
The DISC proposal involves neither the direct granting of a subsidy, the remission of direct taxes, nor an exemption from direct taxes. The essence of the DISC
proposal is that United States tax on the export income derived through such a
corporation, like the United States tax on income of a foreign subsidiary, would
be deferred until distribution to shareholders, at which time the distribution would
be taxed at regular rates.
Therefore, after having considered the provisions of Article XVl:4, official
statements and reports regarding that Article, the internationally accepted past
and present practices of various countries which are also bound by the provisions
of that Article, and having considered in addition the provisions of the United States
Internal Revenue Code for the taxation of income of foreign corporations, and having
regard also for other relevant factors, I am pleased to advise you that, in my opinion, the DISC proposal, as presented to the Committee, is consistent with the obligations of the United States under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Anninger, supra note 28 at, 393-95 n.12.
See also Jackson, supra note 53, at 760-73; Kwako, International Tax Rules, in U.S.
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY 1981: A DRAFT REPORT 6-28 (G. Hufbauer ed.1982); L. GOMES.
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The European Position
a. DISC as a subsidy under GATT

Established in 1946, GATT is a multilateral set of agreements
designed to advance the principles of free trade. 56 While much of
the free trade thrust of GA TT has been in the direction of lowering
tariffs, more recent emphasis has been on the removal of nontariff
barriers such as subsidies. 57 It is in the context of subsidies that
the DISC controversy arises.
In theory, subsidies such as DISC divert international trade
flows from their normal pattern and distort producer incentives
from those determined by comparative advantage. 58 Thus, although
DISC may be beneficial to American interests in isolation, by distorting trade flows in favor of U.S. interests, DISC denies the
benefits of an objective market mechanism to U.S. trading
partners-benefits to which they are entitled under GATT. 59
The GATT language prohibiting subsidies is found in article
XVI, section 4, and comes into play through the fulfillment of two
conditions: (1) the governmental program must be an export subsidy of a nonprimary product; 60 and, (2) the export subsidy must
be found to result in the export sale of such product for a price
lower than that charged in the exporter's domestic market. 61 While
the criterion are indeed specific, no definition of subsidy was ever
included in GATT. 62 What had been outlined, however, in 1960,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, 22-23 (1979). The administration also justified the 1971
DISC legislation to Congress as a response to European border tax adjustment actions. Hearings on the Nomination of John B. Connally to be Secretary of the Treasury Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1971).
56. Comment, The DISC Legislation as a Violation of the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs
and Trade, supra note 17, at 180. See J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF THE
GATT-A LJ::GAL ANALYSIS OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (1969).
57. Comment, supra note 17.
58. Comment, supra note 17, at 181.
59. Comment, supra note 17, at 181-83. See also the text of GATT article XVI, section A:
If any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy, including any form of
income or price support, which operates directly or indirectly to increase exports
of any product from, or to reduce imports of any product into, its territory, it shall
notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES in writing of the extent and nature of the
subsidization, of the estimated effect of the subsidization on the quantity of the
affected product or products imported into or exported from its territory and of
the circumstances making the subsidization necessary.
GATT, article XVI, supra note 2, at 30.
60. GATT, article XVI, para. 4, supra note 2, at 31.
61. Id.
62. E. McGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: GATT, THE UNITED STATES AND
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 251 (1982). The usual reason given for the lack of any definition
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was a list of specific practices which were generally agreed upon
to represent subsidies, the existence of which would set up a prima
facie violation of article XVI. 63

b. Sections (c) and (d) of the 1960
Working Party Agreement on Subsidies 64
In 1973, a GATT panel was formally initiated to investigate
whether sections (c) and (d) of the Working Party Agreement on
Subsidies prohibited direct tax deferrals such as DISC. 65 Prompted
by the complaints of Canada and the EC, the panel sought to determine whether DISC, which is technically a tax deferral, was of such
unlimited duration as to amount to a direct tax exemption. 66 Upon
concluding its investigation, the GATT panel agreed with the EC
and Canada and recommended the GATT Council declare that the
United States had nullified or impaired the GATT benefits of the
petitioners. 67
of a subsidy in GATT centers around a recognition that subsidies can come in a greater
variety of forms than are readily describable by a single definition. By defining subsidy,
the drafters feared not only that the loopholes created by any definition would be greater
than the prohibition of the definition itself, but that contracting parties would strictly construe any criterion given in order to severely limit the scope of Article XVI. Instead
of a definition, the drafters settled for the general language of Article XVI, and the interpretive sections of the GATT Code on Subsidies. See GATT: Agreement on Interpretation
of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII, supra note 3, at 67-70, 81-83.
63. See Report on Subsidies, Provisions of Article XVI:4, supra note 3, at 186.
64. Id. Items (c) and (d) refer respectively to "the remission, calculated in relation to
exports, of direct taxes ... on industrial or commercial enterprises," and "the exemption,
in respect of exported goods, of charges or taxes, other than charges in connection with
importation or indirect taxes levied at one or several stages on the same goods if sold for
internal consumption." Id.
65. 28. The representative of the European Communities referred to the illustrative list of measures which governments prepared to accept the Declaration
giving effect to Article XVI:4-incl-uding the United States Governmentconsidered in general to be subsidies within the meaning of Article XVI:4 and in
particular to items (c) and (d) of that list, which referred respectively to "the remission, calculated in relation to exports, of direct taxes ... on industrial or commercial enterprises," and "the exemption, in respect of exported goods, of charges or
taxes, other than charges in connection with importation or indirect taxes levied
at one or several stages on the same goods if sold for internal consumption."
Report of the GATT Panel, United States Tax Legislation (DISC), supra note 2, at 103.
66. An unlimited deferral of taxes was, according to the European Communities,
equivalent in economic terms to an exemption since the deferral granted by the
DISC legislation was unlimited .... The system, therefore, afforded not a limited
advantage but total exemption from direct federal corporation taxes for one half
of the profits of a DISC accruing from exports.
Report of the GATT Panel, United States Tax Legislation (DISC), supra note 2, at 103.
67. Report of the GATT Panel, United States Tax Legislation (DISC), supra note 2,
at 112-14 §§ 67-80.
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Specifically, the GATT panel argued that because of DISC's
unlimited existence and potential for indefinite deferral, the tax
incentive was potentially a partial tax exemption.68 Without reaching
a conclusion as to this "broader" exemption issue, however, the
panel chose to base its primary objection to DISC on a narrower
finding that because no interest was charged on the deferred tax,
this interest forgiveness was itself a subsidy.69 The panel also faulted
the DISC program's deduction for export promotion expenses 70 and
the less than strict adherence to arm's-length pricing with the 4%
and 50% rules discussed earlier. 11 On this latter ground, the panel
concluded that given the various options under the DISC legislation for the allocation of profits from export sales between manufacturers and DISC's, there was too much leeway for abuse in
measuring the amount of the DISC incentive. 72
2.

The U.S. Position

From the U.S. perspective, DISC is technically a deferral and
therefore not simultaneously an exemption. 73 Moreover, DISC is
equally justifiable as a countermeasure to EC tax export
incentives. 74 This section will focus on the justification the United
States presented for DISC to the GA TT Council.

a. DISC as a means of removing an existing distortion
rather than creating a new distortion in international
trade
The DISC panel was one of four GA TT panels commissioned
in 1973 to investigate the issue of tax export aids. 75 While the DISC
panel was instigated by the EC and Canada, the United States
similarly won an examination of the French, Belgian and Dutch taxation systems on charges they also provided export incentives illegal
68. Id. at 113 § 71.
69. Id. at 113 § 69.
70. Id. at 114 § 76.
71. Id. at 114 § 79.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 104 § 31. See supra note 55.
74. Report of the Panel, United States Tax Legislation (DISC), supra note 2, at 106
§§ 39-42.
75. The other three GATT panels were, by title of final report: Income Tax Practices
Maintained by France, Report of the Panel, GATT Doc. L/4423 (12 Nov. 1976); Income Tax
Practices Maintained by Belgium, Report of the Panel, GATT Doc. L/4424 (12 Nov. 1976);
Income Tax Practices Maintained by the Netherlands, Report of the Panel, GATT Doc. L/4425
(12 Nov. 1976).
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under GATT. 76 From the U.S. perspective, the territorial systems
of these major EC nations were designed to allow parent corporations to shift large amounts of domestic source income to foreign
subsidiaries which were both untaxed domestically and often
incorporated in low tax countries.77 Whereas the EC systems allowed
such profits to be repatriated almost tax free, the systems
guaranteed the parent the fruits of any allocation of domestic profits
to the foreign entity. 78 The root of the problem, the United States
argued, was the nonenforcement of arm's-length intercompany
pricing rules to ensure only profits derived abroad would receive
preferential tax treatment. 79
As a result of the inherent nature of the EC tax systems to
promote exports, and the flexibility of EC intercompany pricing
rules, the United States alleged it was justified in maintaining
DISC. 80 With "approximate" arm's-length pricing standards, DISC
merely brings U.S. intercompany pricing rules closer in line with
those in effect in Europe. 81 Therefore, as a U.S. tax export aid, DISC
is justifiable as a means of neutralizing already existing tax breaks
76. Id. See E. McGOVERN, supra note 62, at 254.
77. Report of the Panel, United States Tax Legislation (DISC), supra note 2, at 106 § 40.
78. Id. In clear contrast to the relaxed nature of European corporate tax practices
are those of many states within the United States. Unlike the European territorial systems
which promote overseas transactions and investment, many states within the United States
have adopted "unitary business/formula apportionment" methods of taxation aimed at taxing the multinational income of instate corporations. This is a very direct method of discouraging overseas operation because of the added tax burden and fears of double taxation. In
contrast to this state practice is the Federal Internal Revenue Code which taxes income
from foreign subsidiaries only to the extent it is remitted to the United States in the form
of corporate dividends. For further background into the contrast of United States and
European taxation of multinational income see the recent U.S. Supreme Court case of
Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 456 U.S. 960, rehearing denied, 104 S.Ct. 365 (1983),
in which a unitary method, like that just described, was upheld against a constitutional
challenge.
79. Report of the GATT Panel, United States Tax Legislation (DISC), supra note 2,
at 106 § 40. The use of arm's-length pricing is important to undistorted trade flows under
a territorial tax system because of the incentive to export which can arise through its absence.
If a producer knows that profits repatriated from overseas subsidiaries are tax free, while
those from domestic transactions are taxed at a normal rate, clearly the effect is to promote export transactions through the foreign subsidiary. With the aid of intercompany price
manipulation, the parent can maximize the favorable result of the foreign tax rules by
charging the subsidiary an at cost price for the good produced at home, so that no taxable
profits accrue to the parent. Then, when the foreign subsidiary resells for export, its low
cost basis in the transaction yields an amount equal to not only its normal profit, but the
parent's as well. The subsidiary then repatriates the parent's portion, which is tax free to
both itself and the parent.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 105 § 38.
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provided to EC producers through intercompany pricing rules and
territorial taxation. 82
The panels found that arm's-length pricing would indeed be
a logical solution, and that EC practices clearly strayed from this
standard in many instances. 83 There was not, however, an inherent
flaw in territorial tax systems which would render them GATT
illegal. 84 On the contrary, as long as arm's-length standards are
observed, territorial systems are a GATT legal means for avoiding
international double taxation. 85 As for the U.S. justification, the
panels concluded any alleged EC distortions were better remedied
by a GATT standard of arm's-length pricing, rather than a posture
of mutually offsetting distortions on both sides of the Atlantic. 86
3.

The Current Status of the Controversy

In adopting the panel findings discussed above, the GA TT Council issued a statement of understanding reached between the
opposing parties which set out three criteria for judging the legality
of tax export aids.87 Briefly, the council concluded that (1) the GATT
treaty will not be interpreted to require signatories to tax economic
processes taking place outside the territorial limits of an exporting
country; 88 (2) article XVI (4) will be interpreted to require arm'slength prices in connection with the taxation of export transactions; 89
and, (3) GATT will not be interpreted as a prohibition on the adoption of measures designed to prevent the double taxation of export
earnings. 90
Since 1981, the GATT Council's findings have been interpreted
to conclude DISC is a violation of the General Agreement. 91 The
United States, however, has consistently maintained that DISC is
GATT legal, mainly in light of the Council's ruling that foreign
82. Id. at 105 § 38, 106-07 §§ 39-42.
83. See GATT panel reports on European tax systems, supra note 75. See also E.
McGOVERN, supra note 62, at 255.
84. E. McGOVERN, supra note 62, at 255.
85. Id.
86. Report of the Panel, United States Tax Legislation, (DISC) supra note 2, at 114 § 79.
87. December 1981 Statement of Understanding, Report accompanying adoption of the
GATT p.anel reports, reprinted in 16 TAX NOTES (CCH) No. 3, at 269 (July 19, 1982).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. DISC Again Under Attack Before the GATT Council, 16 TAX NOTES (CCH) No. 1,
at 81 (July 5, 1982).
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source income need not be taxed directly to comply with GATT. 92
Despite the consistent denial of GATT illegality, the United States
acknowledged in October 1982 that due to the height of the DISC
controversy, an attempt would be made to develop a DISC
substitute. 93 In defense of the decision to seek a DISC substitute,
Treasury Secretary Regan wrote the GATT Council that the U.S.
initiative was taken because "the view held by many of the GA TT
members that the U.S. is not abiding by GATT rules seriously compromises the ability of the United States to use the GATT to defend
its trade interests." 94
The U.S. initiative came into public view in August 1983 with
the introduction of H.R. 3810, the Foreign Sales Corporation Act
of 1983. 95 The proposal, however, received scant consideration in
the Senate and none in the House before the end of the first ses92. Statement of the Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, David R. McDonald, before
the GATT Council, June 29, 1982, reprinted in 16 TAX NOTES (CCH) No. 3, at 269 (July 19,
1982). Specifically, the United States argued that although the question whether the tax
deferral equalled a GATT illegal exemption was originally the issue, with the release granted
by the GATT Council allowing tax exemptions for foreign source income, DISC, which did
no more than this, was legitimized. DISC, the United States stressed, did no more than defer
tax on foreign source income, as such income is defined under applicable United States law.
The Europeans rejected this analysis outright as a clear manipulation of terms. To
the EC, foreign source income was not synonomous with all monies received from abroad.
Rather, foreign source income was income derived from foreign economic processesprocesses which a DISC, as a domestic corporation, could not perform. Therefore, from the
European perspective, the foreign economic processes requirement exempting foreign source
income from mandatory direct taxation did little to help defend the United States' position.
93. Over the past several years, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) has undertaken a detailed examination of the provisions designed to promote exports through DISCs to determine if they are in conformity with the GATT
rules governing export subsidies. Although the United States has vigorously defended DISC, a general consensus has developed among GATT member countries that
the DISC is inconsistent with the GATT and that the United States should bring
its tax practices into compliance with these rules. The view held by many of the
GATT members that the United States is not abiding by GATT rules seriously
compromises the ability of the United States to use the GATT to defend its trade
interests. Accordingly, the Administration believes that the United States should
respect the GATT consensus and attempt to comply with it.
The Treasury Department is now examining various alternatives to the DISC.
Any alternative must be GATT legal and promote sound international economic
policy. A specific legislative proposal will be developed in the context of the fiscal
year 1984 budget process.
Letter from U.S. Treasury Secretary Donald T. Regan to the GATT Council, reprinted in
17 TAX NOTES (CCH) No. 9, at 708 (Nov. 29, 1982).
94. Id.
95. H.R. 3810, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H6580-81 (1983). See supra note 1.
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sion of the 98th Congress. 96 During the second session, S.1804 was
the topic of a Senate Finance Committee hearing on February 3,
1984.97 At that time, Senator Dole declared FSC would be a part
of the omnibus tax bill expected to be reported out of the Finance
Committee on or before April 1, 1984.98
On March 21, 1984, FSC was reported out of the Senate Committee on Finance as a part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984.9aa
Although not a part of the House tax bill for 1984, FSC was maintained as part of the Deficit Reduction Act when passed by the
Senate on May 17, 1984.98h Amended slightly in conference, 9ac FSC
was finally adopted by both Senate and House Conferees on Saturday, June 23, 1984, and passed by both houses on June 27, 1984.98d
The complete 1984 tax bill, including FSC and repeal of DISC, was
signed into law by President Reagan on July 18, 1984.9ae
While responses to FSC have been mixed, the EC has yet
to stop its calls for a GATT working party to assess monetary
damages for the EC countries allegedly injured as a result of
DISC. 99 The United States has repeatedly denounced such attempts to force a monetary settlement for DISC and has warned
that such attacks are counterproductive and likely to result
96. The only consideration FSC received before the end of the 98th Congress, 1st Session, was a brief hearing on Friday, November 18, 1983. Hearing reprint is yet unavailable.
Witnesses at the hearing included: The Honorable Juan Luis, Governor U.S. Virgin Islands;
Evan A. Werling, Vice President, Finance, French Oil Mill Machinery Company, Piqua, Ohio,
on Behalf of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Washington, D.C.; Glen W.
White, Director of Taxes, Dow Chemical Company, on Behalf of Chemical Manufacturers
Association, Washington, D.C.; Michael Fayhee, McDermott, Will & Emery, Chicago, Ill.,
accompanied by Alfred DeGregory, Vice President, Finance, California Almond Growers
Exchange, Sacramento, Calif., on Behalf of the National Council of Farm Cooperatives,
Washington, D.C.; Ron Joranko, Director of Taxes, TRW, Incorporated, Arlington, Va.,
accompanied by Robert Ragland, Director of Taxation, National Association of Manufacturers,
Washington, D.C.
97. Finance Panel to Include FSC Proposal in Tax Bill, DAILY TAX REPORT (BNA) No.
24, at LL-1 (Feb. 6, 1984).
98. Id.
98a. See supra note 1.
98b. Id.
98c. Id.
98d. Washington Post, June 28, 1984, at Al, col. 5.
98e. See supra note 1.
99. Prior to enactment see, European Community Renews its Call for DISC Damages
Study at the GATT, 19 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No.10, at 363 (June 7, 1983); U.S. Takes
Strong Defensive Stance Against EC Attack on DISC at GATT 20 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA)
No. 2, at 50 (Oct. 11, 1983). Subsequent to enactment see, Washington Post, July 12, 1984,
at D6, col. 6.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol11/iss1/4

16

et al.: Foreign Sales Corporations: a Viable Solution to the Disc Controv

Foreign Sales Corporations

1984]

63

in turning Congress away from dealing objectively with the
DISC situation. 100

III. THE FOREIGN SALES CORPORATION
ACT OF 1983 (FSC)
A. A TECHNICAL/THEORETICAL DESCRIPTION

As a GATT legal substitute for DISC, FSC is conceptually
grounded on the GATT Council's pronouncement releasing signatories from any obligation to tax the foreign economic processes
of domestic firms. 101 In form, therefore, FSC is to be incorporated
abroad and actually possess the presence with which to generate
the income receiving U.S. tax exemption. 102 In this way, the proposal conforms the alleged propensity of DISC to subsidize U.S.
producers through a potentially indefinite deferral on certain
domestic source income. 103
Like DISC, FSC is a tax incentive to export. Unlike DISC,
however, FSC works through a 100% repatriated dividends deduction for FSC corporate parents 104 and a limited corporate income
tax exemption for the FSC itself. 105 For dividends declared from
a portion of the FSC income also exempted from U.S. direct
taxation, 106 the dividends received deduction ensures that no level
of U.S. corporate tax is imposed on a portion of FSC income. 107
Therefore, within the limits set by the proposal, the more exporting
a parent does through an FSC, the more tax exempt income, and
the lower the combined effective tax rate on export transactions.
To qualify as an FSC, a corporation must have its shares held
by no more than twenty-five persons, 108 and satisfy both the foreign
presence and foreign economic processes requirements. In terms
of foreign presence, an FSC must (1) maintain an office outside U.S.
territory; 109 (2) maintain a summary of its permanent books of
100. See 19, 20 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA), supra note 99.
101. Reference is to criteria (1) for judging the GATT legality of tax export aids promulgated by the GATT Council upon the adoption of the DISC panel report. See Report on
Acceptance of Panel Reports, supra note 87.
102. 26 U.S.C. §§ 923, 924 (West Supp. 1985).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 64-69.
104. 26 U .S.C. § 245(c) (West Supp. 1985).
105. Id. § 923.
106. Id. § 926.
107. Joint Committee Print, supra note 11, at 26.
108. 26 U.S.C. § 922(a)(l)(B) (West Supp. 1985).
109. Id. § 922(a)(l)(D)(i). The specific requirement is to maintain an office, and under
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account at its foreign office; 110 (3) have at least one director who
is resident outside the United States; 111 and, (5) be incorporated outside the United States. 112
In connection with income earned by an FSC, the following
foreign economic processes must be evidenced by the FSC itself.
First, the FSC must participate in the solicitation, the registration
or the making of any contract related to a transaction from which
an FSC will be assigned income. 113 This test is met if either the FSC,
or anyone under contract with it, performs one or more of these
three activities outside the United States. 114
Second, the FSC must fulfill the foreign direct cost- total direct
cost ratio. 115 Under this test, the foreign direct costs of an FSC,
attributable to any transaction from which an FSC will be assigned
income, must meet the 50% 116 or 85% foreign direct cost
requirement. 117
Under both ratios, direct costs are related to the costs incurred
for: (1) advertising and sales promotion; 118 (2) the processing of
customer orders and the arranging for delivery of the export
property; 119 (3) transportation from the time of acquisition by the
FSC to the delivery to the customers; 120 (4) the determination and
transmittal of a final invoice or statement of account and the receipt
of payment; 121 and, (5) the assumption of credit risk. 122
§ 922(aK1KAKi) to be incorporated, see infra note 113, in a country which has either an exchange
of information treaty pursuant to § 274(h)(6)(C), or an income tax treaty with the United
States. 26 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(l)(A)(i), 274(hK6)(C) (West Supp. 1985). See also Id. § 927(e)(3).
110. A complete set of books and records must also be kept available in the United
States for U.S. tax administration and enforcement. 26 U.S.C. § 922(a)(l)(D)(ii-iii) (West Supp.
1985).
111. id. § 922(a)(l)(E).
112. Incorporation in either Guam, the Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of the
Northern Marianas or American Samoa is also acceptable. Id. § 927(d)(5). As discussed in
note 109 supra, the intention is that a foreign country, to be eligible for FSC incorporation,
not be a country that has a law denying U.S. officials access to the corporate records of
companies owned by U.S. citizens. This explains the need for an exchange of information
or tax treaty pursuant to § 927(e)(3). Id. § 927(eK3). For further discussion see, 130 CONG.
REC. 46636 pt. II (daily ed. June 22, 1984) [hereinafter cited as 1984 Tax Conference Report].
113. 26 U.S.C. § 924(d)(l), (d)(l)(A) (West Supp. 1985).
114. Id. See Joint Committee Print, supra note 11, at 29.
115. 26 U.S.C. § 924(d)(l)(B), & (2) (West Supp. 1985).
116. Id. § 924(d)(l)(B).
117. Id. § 924(d)(2).
118. Id. § 924(e)(l).
119. Id. § 924(e)(2).
120. Id. § 924(e)(3).
121. Id. § 924(e)(4).
122. Id. § 924(e)(5).
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In relation to the 50% requirement, the ratio of direct costs
incurred abroad to the total direct costs for the transaction must
be at least 50%. 123 In relation to the 85% requirement, the ratio
of any two of the direct costs outlined above, when performed
abroad, to the total direct costs for the transaction must be at least
85%. 124
For an FSC that satisfies the above requirements, both the
FSC and its U.S. parent are eligible for a limited U.S. tax exemption on a portion of their income from export sales. The calculation of this benefit is the result of a two step process. First, the
FSC's net export earnings 125 are calculated based on either (a) the
arm's-length cost of the export good; 126 (b) a portion of the FSC's
foreign trading gross receipts; 121 or, (c) an allocation of the FSC's
and the parent's combined export income. 128 Second, the FSC's tax
exempt income 129 is calculated to correspond to that income which
is directly traceable to the FSC's foreign economic processes. 130 The
former figure is the primary basis upon which tax exempt dividends
are declared and repatriated to the U.S. parent. 131 Only after exhausting this source can the FSC distribute its own tax exempt
earnings. 132
The FSC's net export earnings, or foreign trading income,1 33
is the income generated from the FSC's foreign trading gross
receipts. 134 Generally, foreign trading gross receipts are gross
receipts from the sale or lease of property outside the United
States. 135 From this gross receipts figure, FSC net export earnings
123. Id. § 924(d)(l)(B).
124. Id. § 924(d)(2).
125. These net export earnings correspond to the FSC's foreign trade income from
foreign trading gross receipts. Id. §§ 923(b), 924.
126. Id. § 925(a)(3).
127. Foreign trading gross receipts are defined at Id. § 924; transfer-price-incomeallocation rules are defined at Id. § 925(a)(l).
128. Id. § 925(a)(2).
129. This figure corresponds to Id. § 923 entitled "exempt foreign trading income."
130. Id. § 921.
131. Id. § 927(c).
132. Id. § 926(a).
133. Id. § 923(b).
134. Id.
135. Foreign trading gross receipts are gross receipts from:
(a) the sale, exchange, or other disposition of export property;
(b) the lease or rental of export property that is used by the lessee outside the
United States;
(c) the performance of services that are related and subsidiary to the sale, exchange,
lease, rental or other disposition of export property by the FSC;
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are calculated as either (a) the balance left after subtracting an
arm's-length transfer price for the export goods bought from the
parent; 136 (b) 23% of the combined taxable income of the FSC and
its parent; 137 or, (c) 1.83% of the FSC's foreign trading gross
receipts,1 388 but not more than 46% of the combined taxable income of
the FSC and the parent. 138b
Method (a) represents the conforming section to the GA TT pronouncement on arm's-length pricing between related parties. 139
Methods (b) and (c), however, are administrative pricing rules
designed to approximate an arm's-length transaction where one is
not easily distinguished. 140
Once the FSC's net export earnings are calculated, the second
step, as outlined above,1 41 is to calculate that portion of the FSC's
net export earnings which is directly traceable to the FSC's foreign
economic processes. This portion of the net export earnings is called
tax exempt foreign trading income, 142 and is calculated by a method
dependent upon the transfer pricing method used to calculate the
net earnings figure. If an arm's-length price was used, 32% of the
net earnings become tax exempt. 143 If an administrative pricing rule
was used, the tax exempt net earnings are either 16% of the com(d) the performance of engineering or architectural services for construction projects located outside the United States; and
(e) the performance of managerial services in furtherance of the production of foreign
export trading gross receipts.
Id. § 924. The provision for managerial services, § 924(a)(5), was qualified in Conference to
include the following limitation: "Paragraph (5) [related to managerial services] shall not
apply to a FSC for any taxable year unless at least 50 percent of its gross receipts for such
taxable year is from activities described in paragraph (1), (2) or (3) [(a), (b) and (c) above].''
Although the intent of this change from the original Act is not expressly written in the
conference report, the impact is clearly to add greater substance to the FSC foreign presence.
In this way, the Conference amendment acts to bring FSC more closely in line with the GATT
foreign economic processes requirement. See supra note 87 and text accompanying supra
note 89.
136. Id. § 925(a)(3).
137. Id. § 925(a)(2).
138a. Id. § 925(a)(l).
138b. Id. § 925(d).
139. Joint Committee Print, supra note 11, at 30.
140. Id. In order to use the administrative pricing rules, an FSC must meet two requirements. First, all of the activities which fall into the category of direct costs under §
924(e) must be performed abroad by the FSC. Second, all the activities related to the
negotiating and making the contract for the export sale must be performed abroad by the
FSC. 26 U.S.C. §§ 924, 925 (West Supp. 1985).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 133-38b.
142. 26 U.S.C. § 923 (West Supp. 1985).
143. Id. § 923(a)(2).
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bined income of the parent and the FSC 144 or 1.27% of the FSC's
gross sales up to 3% of FSC income. 145
Finally, the parent's benefit comes through the repatriation
of FSC net earnings in the form of tax exempt dividends. 146 While
the FSC is free to declare dividends from all net export earnings those possessing as well as those lacking tax exempt status on the
FSC level- distributions are treated as being made first out of the
nonexempt earnings and then out of the exempt category .147 Thus,
there is no corporate level tax on exempt FSC net earnings whether
retained or distributed, and only a single-level corporate tax on net
earnings other than the exempt variety .148
B.

SMALL BUSINESS EXCEPTIONS

In order to provide relief for small businesses who may find
the foreign presence and economic process requirements burdensome, the DISC replacement legislation provides two alternatives
to FSC: the interest charge DISC 149 and the small FSC. 150 The
premise of each option is that for small exporters, the benefits of
FSC are outweighed by the costly foreign presence requirements.
Thus, without these alternatives, such exporters would curtail
export promotion. 1503
1.

The Interest Charge DISC

Any previously or newly qualified DISC 151 with ten million
dollars or less in qualified export receipts 152 may continue, under
the DISC replacement legislation, to operate as a DISC and defer
tax liability on that limited portion of its income. 153 Three major
144. Id. § 923(a)(3).
145. Id. See 1984 Tax Conference Report, supra note 113, at H6636.
146. 26 U.S.C. § 926 (West Supp. 1985).
147. Id. § 926(a).
148. Joint Committee Print, supra note 11, at 32.
149. 26 U.S.C. § 995(f) (West Supp. 1985).
150. Id. § 924(b)(2).
150a. See 1984 Tax Conference Report, supra note 113, at H6636.
151. Interest charge DISCs will be administered under the same sections of the IRC,
with minor amendments, as are current DISCs. 26 U.S.C. §§ 991-996 (West Supp. 1985). Thus,
qualification as an interest charge DISC is primarily the same as qualification as a DISC
today. The GATT legality of the DISC is technically provided for with the interest charge.
In reality, however, because concern over DISC is centered mainly around large corporate
exporters, small DISCs with $10,000 or less in qualified exports receipts are expected to
be ignored for purposes of the debate over a GA TT legal substitute for DISC.
152. Id. § 995(b)(l)(E).
153. Id.
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changes, however, accompany this new DISC. First, all deemed
distributions relating to base period exports (the incremental rule)
and to one-half of the DISC's income have been eliminated. 154 Second,
an interest charge on the DISC shareholders' deferred tax liability
will now be collected on an annual basis. 155 The rate to be charged
is to be based on the average investment yield of fifty-two week
T-bills. 156 Third, any qualified export receipts in excess of the ten
million dollar limit will be deemed distributed to DISC shareholders
and fully taxed. 157
2. The Small FSC

A small FSC is identical to the FSC described above with two
exceptions. First, it may only receive favorable tax treatment on
five million dollars or less of its foreign trading gross receipts. 158
Second, it will be exempt from the foreign management and foreign
economic process requirements. 159 Any income above the five million
dollar limit does not qualify as foreign trading gross receipts and
is directly included in the FSC's U.S. tax base. 160
C.

CURRENTLY DEFERRED DISC INCOME

A simple but major provision of the FSC proposal is a tax
forgiveness provision for previously deferred DISC income. 161 As
of January 1, 1985, any accumulated DISC income will be treated
as previously taxed income for purposes of any future tax liability .162
154. 1984 Tax Conference Report, supra note 113, at H6512, section 802(a)(l).
155. 26 U.S.C. § 995(f) (West Supp. 1985).
156. Id.
157. Id. § 995(b)(l)(E).
158. Id. § 924(b)(2)(B)(i).
159. Id. § 924(b)(2)(A).
160. Id. § 921(d).
161. 1984 Tax Conference Report, supra note 113, at H6513, section 804(5)(2).
162. Id. The international and domestic legal implications of DISC deferred tax
forgiveness are arguably much more significant than the practical effects. As stated in the
text accompanying notes 196-202, the inclusion of a deferred tax forgiveness provision is
arguably an admission that DISC was an export subsidy all along. This is not the most
favorable conclusion considering the United States consistently defended DISC and as a GATT
legal temporary deferral.
To the current DISC user, the forgiveness provision, while absolutely essential, is
nonetheless what had been expected- not to mention what DISC users had been led to believe
by the Treasury Department all along. While there is no question the very large accumulated
deferrals of some major corporations, such as Boeing Corp., could cause bankruptcies if they
were deemed currently due, DISC users were led to believe this would never occur.
First, no interest charge on the deferred amount is contrary to usual IRS procedure
concerning deferral or currently non-recognized tax liability. One could argue that the lack
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. FSC AND GATT

The basic question of an FSC's GA TT legality is best studied
from two inter-related perspectives. One is strict GA TT legality:
does FSC comply with the strict legal rules of GATT? The other
is "GATT-ability": will FSC buy peace with our European trading
partners? 163 These two terms often co-exist, but with the EC
majority in GATT, the second is arguably the most telling. 164 In fact,
given the structure of GATT investigatory procedures, if a contracting party does not actually challenge a DISC substitute, no
investigation of it would be made. 165 Thus, under a standard of
of diligence shown by Congress and the IRS to keep track of deferred income in constant
dollars and save the present value revenue loss through interest payments is strong evidence
Congress had already written off deferred DISC income. Second, the accepted accounting
practice of not taking deferred DISC tax liability into account for computing current net
income is misleading to investors, as well as overstates income, if that liability were not
understood by corporate directors and accountants to be as good as forgiven. Finally, and
most persuasive, is the existence of such huge accumulated corporate deferrals in and amongst
themselves. If Congress expected to end the DISC program anytime soon without a
forgiveness provision, it is highly unlikely these amounts would have been allowed to accrue.
Declaring them suddenly due would be tantamount to declaring bankruptcy for many DISC
users, if not serious financial ruin. Certainly it is easy to say these entities brought this
on themselves, but the reality still exists and no Congress could ignore the implications
of such an action.
Thus, while DISC deferred tax forgiveness is a thorn in future U.S./GATT relations
with the EC and Canada, the reaction of domestic producers is clearly one of less than complete surprise.
163. The terms "GATT legal" and "GA TT-able" are those used by the author in Field,
A.dministration Proposes DISC Replacement Plan, 18 TAX NOTES (CCH)No. ll,at977-78(Mar.
14, 1983). They are particularly relevant because they describe the unique forces at work
within the GATT Council. While there are clear standards of GATT legality, the United
States must also be aware of the sensitivities of the European based majority. No doubt
GATT legality is an avowed precedent-but there is clear evidence within the DISC controversy that portrays the EC as particularly preoccupied with defeating DISC regardless
of the reasonableness of any U.S. justification put forth. See e.g., U.S. Defense of DISC Before
GATT, 16 TAX NOTES (CCH) No. 3, at 269 (July 19, 1982), contrasted with the initial EC
response found in DISC Again Under Attack Before GATT Council, 16 TAX NOTES (CCH) No.
l, at 81 (July 5, 1982). This theme of the need for both GATT legality and GATT-ability
is developed further in the text following this note.
164. To see the extent to which the United States has gone to appease the Europeans
on the DISC issue, and similarly to restore U.S. credibility before the GATT Council, see
supra note 93, and the letter by Secretary Regan to the GATT Council.
165. As it relates to subsidies and the GATT, Article XVI declares that only "upon
request" will discussions with the alleged subsidizing government take place. They do not
automatically occur through an ongoing monitoring of CONTRACTING PARTY practices.
See GATT, article XVI, supra note 2, at A60. For further explanation of the GATT dispute
resolution procedures, see K. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1970).
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"GATT-ability," it should not be surprising that what is GATT
illegal may be able to pass GATT muster-if it is acceptable from
the European perspective. 166
1.

The Foreign Economic Processes Requirement161

Conceptually, a system which offers domestic income tax
exemptions in proportion to the level of a firm's foreign economic
processes is clearly both GATT legal and GATT-able. 168 An FSC,
therefore, with its foreign economic processes and presence requirements, is conceptually unassailable. Whether the level and
breadth of the foreign activity required, however, is proportional
to the proposal's alleged net foreign source income component, is
another question entirely .169
It is difficult to accurately generalize the active ingredients
of one percentage of income generation. It is a task, however, which
must be satisfactorily accomplished in order to determine the
GATT legality of FSC. 110 Under an FSC transaction at arm's-length,
166. Here the scenario would involve an EC practice that was arguably GATT illegal
but to which the U.S. response was retaliation in a non-GATT-sensitive manner instead of
a complaint before the GATT Council. The reverse situation is also possible, of course. It
is worth adding at this point that while reference here is made primarily to the EC, the
EC majority, and to the United States, the conclusion to be drawn is not that these are
the only parties to the GATT. However, from the perspective of the DISC controversy,
these, as well as Canada, are the primary players.
167. "Requirement" refers to the GATT pronouncement on giving direct tax exemptions only in proportion to the level of foreign economic processes. This requirement is derived
from the first criteria adopted by the GATT Council upon the acceptance of the GATT panel
reports: The GATT treaty will not be interpreted to require signatories to tax economic
processes taking place outside the territorial limits of an exporting country. See GATT Acts
on Export Aid Panel Reports, 13 TAX NOTES (CCH) No. 24, at 1485 (Dec. 14, 1981). See also E.
McGOVERN, supra note 62, at 255. Thus, if the United States wishes to give direct tax exemptions to stimulate exports in the form of FSC, there must be a foreign economic process
requirement to comply with GATT.
168. This conclusion is drawn from the first criteria adopted by the GA TT Council upon
the acceptance of the DISC panel report. Acceptance of the DISC panel report was given
conditionally upon:
the understanding that with respect to these cases (DISC, etc ... .) and in general,
economic processes (including transactions involving exported goods) located outside the territorial limits of the exporting country need not be subject to taxation
by the exporting country and should not be regarded as export activities in terms
of Article XVl(4) of the General Agreement.
Statement of GATT Council, December 1, 1981, reprinted in E. McGOVERN. supra note 62,
at 255.
169. The contrast here is between what is conceptually required for direct tax exemptions to be used as tax exports aids and what the physical manifestations of these conceptual requirements are within the DISC replacement legislation.
170. See supra notes 168-69.
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the proposal exempts 32% of the net foreign trade income from
U.S. direct taxation. The issue, therefore, is whether an over onethird profit allocation for an FSC's "watered-down" disposition function is a justifiable proportion. 171
While no definitive answer to this question is offered, a
reasonable starting point might be to say that the question is contingent upon the type of operation to which such a scheme is applied.
Take, for example, a fully integrated parent corporation, which
exports exclusively through a foreign subsidiary .172 Based on an
arm's-length transaction, 173 the parent receives its full domestic
mark-up, through the sale to the subsidiary, before the product hits
the foreign market. 174 The domestic source side of the transaction
is complete.
Similarly, for the foreign subsidiary which has paid the arm'slength price for the product it will sell abroad, any "resale" markup the subsidiary attaches must be equated to some value it has
added for the transaction to clear under competitive market
conditions. 175 Such is the origin of a foreign source income
component.
171. The one third profit allocation alluded to here refers to the 32% tax exemption
for FSC foreign trade income based on an arm's-length transaction. 26 U.S.C. § 923(a)(2) (West
Supp. 1985). In terms of disposition functions, the label "watered-down" is applied because
only either the 50% or 85% rules for foreign direct costs associated with disposition need
to be followed to claim the 32% exemption. Id. § 924(d). For further detailed explanation
see infra text accompanying notes 101-48.
172. A fully integrated parent would be one where all vertical levels of production are
operated by the parent itself. In other words, from collection of resources to packaging for
shippin·g, the parent operates as one unit and performs all functions.
173. For definition see supra note 31.
174. The following example will illustrate this type of transaction. As an integrated
producer, the parent produces a good at cost X. X represents almost a pure input cost as
all levels of production are internal to the parent. In other words, X does not contain any
profit-taking by outside intermediate producers. On top of X, the parent adds, say, a 20%
mark-up. The cost, therefore, on an arm's-length basis for the foreign sales subsidiary, is
X + .2X = Y. Domestic source profits equal the parent's net income (Y - X) = .2X. The
cost basis for the subsidiary becomes Y. Bear in mind that this is somewhat simplified in
terms of actual cost breakdown.
175. The concept here is much simpler than it appears. Based on the example, supra
note 174, if the foreign sales subsidiary has cost Y, which is an arm's-length transfer price,
that will be the open market price for the good's resale unless the value of the product
is increased by the subsidiary. "Increasing the product's value" means that for a foreign
consumer, the good is worth more than the domestic transfer price Y. This is due to many
factors such as unavailability except by export, transportation and distribution costs, as
well as foreign office overhead. Export goods consumers, therefore, perceive the good's price
in relation to these added costs. For the foreign sales subsidiary, the new or resale cost
is Y + Z, where Z is transportation and disposition costs, including foreign office overhead.
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What complicates any analogy from this conceptually simple
scenario to the working of an FSC is that an FSC is not technically
equivalent to a strict independent foreign subsidiary. In a strict
parent/independent-subsidiary transaction, it is likely no substantive activity to complete the foreign sale occurs from the domestic
side once the parent releases ownership of the good to the
subsidiary. 176 With an FSC, however, this assumption is somewhat
altered. Under the 50% and 85% rules, 177 only those percentages
of what would be 100% foreign disposition costs for a strict independent subsidiary are the actual FSC costs incurred abroad. In other
words, where all the costs attributable to a foreign subsidiary's
resale are undertaken abroad in the strict independent subsidiary
example, under FSC, the same profits accrue, with only an effective 50% foreign disposition cost requirement. 178 It is, therefore,
only from this 50% foreign-incurred disposition cost that foreign
source income can be derived. 179 Those percentages of income from
Add to this the subsidiary's mark-up, say 5%, then final foreign consumer cost is (Y + Z)
+ .05 (Y + Z), or P x(export price). Under competitive market conditions, P xis the cost to foreign
consumers. The foreign source net income component, or that derived from foreign economic
processes, is .05Z. Remember that since Y is the price paid for a good produced in the U.S.,
it yields domestic source income. The figure .05Y, however, is still net income to the foreign
sales subsidiary.
176. Such a relationship would be where the foreign subsidiary performed 100% of the
disposition function abroad and incurred all such costs after paying the arm's-length price.
Referring again to the scenario described supra notes 174-75, the point is that Z represents
costs incurred abroad solely by the foreign subsidiary.
177. For explanation see supra text accompanying notes 115-24.
178. Again, referring to the example, supra notes 174-76, where the foreign source net
income component is .05Z, the assumption was that the foreign subsidiary would incur cost
Z completely as a foreign direct cost. Thus the 5% mark-up was attributable to foreign incurred costs up to the fraction of total cost: Z I (Y + Z). Under FSC, however, Z is not 100%
foreign direct costs, but rather only 50%. Thus, .05 (.5Z) is the real foreign source net income component. The essential point being that .05 (.5Z), the residual, is a further domestic
source component because up to that percentage of Z can be performed from the United
States. In complete form, our example yields the following results: P x = (Yd + Zr + Zd) +
.05 (Yd + Zr + Zd), where Zr and Zd represent costs incurred abroad and in the United States,
respectively, both chargeable to the FSC and equal to .5Z.
179. See supra note 178. It is important before proceeding, that the GATT interpretation of the terms domestic and foreign source net income are clearly understood. Under the
FSC proposal and the GATT pronouncement on foreign economic processes, see supra notes
168-69, domestic source income, which is not eligible for direct tax exemption under the
GATT, is that which is derived from domestic economic processes. Foreign source income
is that which is derived from foreign economic processes. The critical point of understanding is that costs paid with monies from abroad are not costs of foreign economic processes
unless the activity actually occurs abroad. Thus, even though a good is sold abroad and paid
for with monies from abroad, that is not foreign source income unless the income is derived
in connection with some sort of foreign value added.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol11/iss1/4

26

et al.: Foreign Sales Corporations: a Viable Solution to the Disc Controv

1984]

Foreign Sales Corporations

73

the export sale attributable to the cost of the domestically produced
product and the parent's disposition functions are not considered
derived from foreign economic processes. 180
Based on the 50% figure derived above, if the cost breakdown
of the product being sold is 85% for the product itself and 15%
for disposition, transportation and overhead, the net per transaction FSC foreign source income component is 7.5%, while the
domestic source component is 92.50/o. 181
Returning, then, to the question of an FSC's exemption in relation to the substance of the required foreign economic processes,
the GATT requirement of proportionality is clearly violated in cases
such as those illustrated above. If the 32% exemption is compared
to the 7.5% foreign source net income component, the proposal can
arguably result in an exemption which is at the least 77% domestic
source income. 182 Under a set of operating circumstances like those
described above, it appears that FSC can produce an exemption
which is out of line with the GATT foreign economic processes
requirement.
Perhaps even more troublesome, though, to the GATT legality
of FSC is the calculation of the cost breakdown that would be
required to render a particular parent-FSC relationship GATT
legal. For the FSC 32% direct tax exemption to be 100%, as opposed
to 23% foreign source, foreign disposition costs under the 50%
direct cost election would have to be a least 64% of the export sales

180. See supra note 179.
181. Adding a final step to the example derived supra notes 174-78, if we substitute
85% for Y and 15% for Z (7.5%Zd and 7.5%Zr), the result is that 92.5% (85% + 7.5%) of the
.05 mark-up figure is derived from domestic economic processes and 7.5% is derived from
foreign economic processes.
Recapping the complete example with the terminology of the FSC, the corresponding
figures evolve. Foreign trading income is calculated to be .05 (Yd + Zr + Zd), while exempt
foreign trading income equals 32% of this figure. In foreign and domestic source terms,
and using the 85% / 15% split outlined above, at most 23% of the 32% exemption is really
an exemption based on foreign economic processes, while at least 77% is an exemption based on domestic economic processes (23% = .05(Zr) I .32 (.05 (Yd + Zr + Zd)]).
The results of this example are based on a 1:1 cost-profit generation ratio. Given
cost accounting assumptions, this is not an erroneous figure. Also, the example assumes
that Z, which is intended to correspond to 26 U.S.C. § 924(e) (West Supp. 1985) activities,
is representative of the only costs of the FSC. Clearly there are foreign presence costs which
are not subject to the 50% split. Even if they were to be included in the example, however,
at most the results would be changed to an 80% I 20% cost split and an exemption made
of 31 % (.05(10) /.32 (.05 (80 + 10 + 10))) foreign source and 69% domestic source incomestill way out of proportion.
182. See supra note 181.
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price. 183 Such a scenario would then allow the parent's transfer price
to represent no more than 36% of the export price. 184 While this
may be possible in the absence of an arm's-length standard, it
appears highly unlikely that with arm's-length pricing the price or
value of the good sold would be less than half the amount of the
final export price 185 - particularly given the limited foreign disposition cost component called for under the FSC proposal. 1858
While FSC is not per se GATT illegal, the situations under
which the economic processes requirement are met appear remote
at best. While FSC is clearly conceptually GATT legal, the practical consequences of the proposal appear to strain any notion of
strict GATT legality or GATT-ability.
2.

The Interest Charge DISC and Small FSC Exceptions
a. Interest Charge DISC186

The findings of the GATT panel on DISC pointed directly to
the lack of any interest charge on a DISC shareholder's deferred
tax liability as a form of illegal subsidy .187 It would seem reasonable
to conclude, therefore, that an interest charge DISC would appease
European concerns. While the logic of such a conclusion is clear,
it is still doubtful that an interest charge DISC is either GATT legal
or, more importantly, GATT-able.
The GATT panel on DISC, while resting its decree of noncompliance on the absence of an interest charge, set out to
investigate the legality of DISC's potentially unlimited tax
183. Using the formula outlined in note 182 supra, the value of Zr needed to make the
32% exemption 100% foreign source is 32%. If this is not intuitively correct, 100% = .05(32)
I .32[.05(36 + 32 + 32)). Then, given the 50% foreign direct cost proportion requirement
explained in note 178 supra, total foreign direct cost must account for 64% of the export
profit or net income (.05(36 + 64) = 1.8 + 3.2 = 5; 3.2 / 5 = 64%).
184. If Zr + Zd = 64%, then Yd must equal 36% where 100% of the profit equals .05 (Yd
+ Zr + Zd). See notes 174-83 supra for any lost steps in this analysis.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 116-25.
185a. As described in note 79 supra, under a system which allows transfer price
manipulation, a parent could charge a sufficiently low transfer price to the foreign subsidiary
so that a disproportionately large amount of the final export price appears to correspond
to a foreign source component. Under such a system, it would be possible to have a 64%
foreign source component on paper. For the reasons outlined in note 79 supra and accompanying text, under an arm's-length standard and the FSC foreign cost requirement, it is not
likely.
186. 26 U.S.C. § 995(b)(l)(E) (West Supp. 1985).
187. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
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deferral. 188 On this latter ground, the EC had alleged the unlimited
deferral to be equivalent to a permanent direct tax exemption. 189
Direct tax exemptions, calculated in relation to exports, are illegal
subsidies under GA TT .190 The issue necessarily arises, therefore,
that given the tax forgiveness provision for past DISC deferrals
under FSC, 191 what is the chance interest charge DISCs are also
destined to be direct tax exemptions?
While no one knows whether future DISC forgiveness is in the
offing, a logical European concern would be that while technically
a deferral, the odds favor interest charge DISCs someday becoming
exemptions. Moreover, looking to the demonstrated reality of DISC
utilization, producers who set up DISCs operate undeniably on the
assumption that deferrals will never be recognized. 192 A single look
at the balance sheets of corporations such as Boeing do not reveal
their multi-million dollar deferrals listed as payables. 193
The conclusion, therefore, is that while the United States may
have been previously able to redesign DISC as a legitimate tax
deferral, now, with the forgiveness provision, no country is going
to reject what it always "knew" to be true: DISC is and always
will be an exemption. While the United States may downplay the
interest charge DISC as an insignificant exception, the anger of the
EC over the FSC forgiveness provision is likely to carry over to
any attempt by the United States to create a GATT legal DISC.
In terms of GATT-ability, if not GATT legality, DISC is a dirty
word.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See Report of Working Party on Provisions of Article XVl:4, supra note 3, at 50.
See also Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII, supra
note 3, at 70.
191. 1984 Tax Conference Report, supra note 113, at H6513, section 804.
192. See Statement of Accounting Principles Board, reprinted in Anninger, supra note
28, at 404: "the contingent tax liability (related to DISC tax-deferred income) is so remote
that it need not even be considered in the compilation of annual earnings."
In a letter of May 8, 1984 from 18 Washington Trade associations to Rep. Rostenkowski
(D-Ill.), Chairman, House Committee on Ways and Means, it was stated that:
DISC-generated investments were made on the basis of assurances by successive
administrations that the DISC deferrals were intended to continue indefinitely so
long as invested in export assets ... . To tax these deferrals retroactively would
unjustifiably penalize U.S. exporters who in good faith liave followed the requirement of the DISC statute over the years.
Prospects Uncertain on Foreign Sales Corporation Provision, 23 TAX NOTES (CCH) No. 4, at
823 (May 21, 1984).
193. BOEING CORPORATION, 1982 ANNUAL REPORT 10 (1983).
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b. The Small FSC
One possible explanation for allowing this blatantly GATT
illegal exception centers on the likely low volume of trade it will
foster in relation to the vast number of producers for which it will
be unavailable. To paraphrase one source, because the EC only complained about the large exporters using DISCs, the little-man's
exception should be acceptable. 194 Why then the exception? Such
statements belie the small-FSC-supporters argument. If it is such
an inconsequential addition, why risk acceptance of the proposal
to include a small FSC?
Clearly, the existence of strong support for the small FSC
stems from the not so inconsequential lobby that won its inclusion.
There may be, therefore, a well placed group waiting in the wings
to utilize this provision. A pre-emptive challenge may be made to
the small FSC unless the United States can convince the EC of the
insignificance of this provision. GA TT legality no; in this case,
however, if the United States can win GATT-ability, it may be
enough.
3.

The DISC Deferred Tax Forgiveness Provision

Besides the strictly GATT legal issues of the FSC transfer
pricing195 and foreign activities requirements, 196 there is one issue
of GATT-ability which could create a problem potentially more
significant than any of the GATT legal issues already anticipated:
What to do with the deferred taxes on existing DISCs. 197 To the
EC, treating this deferred tax as forgiven, as FSC does, would be
an admission that DISC was a subsidy all along. 198 United States'
credibility would be severely tarnished. 199 Even if FSC is found acceptable, there may be an attempt by the EC in the GATT Council
to collect the entire amount as compensation to injured EC
producers. 200 Thus, the United States could be inviting an even more
194. See supra note 192.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 87-90.
196. Id.
197. Tax deferred income on existing DISCs is estimated for 1981, the latest year
available, to be $3.6 billion. 1983 TREASURY REPORT ON DISC 21.
198. Brown; supra note 53, at 158.
199. Id.
200. EC members in GA TT are already attempting to create a working party just to
access damages to their domestic producers due to DISC. Given this hotly debated issue,
a move to redirect that cry toward forgiven DISC income would not be an unexpected step.
See supra notes 100-01.
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bitter debate than it presently faces over the legality of DISC. The
move toward forgiveness might even stall future debate of U.S. proposals aimed at protecting American markets from any degree of
EC subsidy. Ironically, avoiding such a situation was the very reason
the United States compromised and decided to present a DISC
alternative. 201
B. FSC AS A MEANS OF OFFSETTING
EXISTING EC TRANSFER PRICE PRACTICES

During the discussion on DISC above, it was stated that
because of DISC's "approximate" arm's-length pricing rules, DISC
was a justifiable countermeasure to the lack of rigor with which
arm's-length pricing is enforced and practiced in the EC. 202 It is
arguable, therefore, that unless FSC can similarly aid in neutralizing
the preferential treatment of EC intercompany pricing, without
DISC, there will be a net export incentive advantage in favor of
the EC. 203 Is FSC an effective neutralizer in the sense just described?
The answer to this question is an unqualified "no." FSC is based
squarely on arm's-length principles. 204 The administrative pricing
rules contain an upper limit which is below what could conceivably
pass under a strict arm's-length standard. 205 In terms of enforcement, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service is ready, willing and
specifically empowered to set aside transactions which fail to comly with section 482. 206 It seems doubtful, then, that FSC is capable
of hiding domestic profits in transfer prices so as to make them
part of FSC income. Without DISC, therefore, the EC retains an
unmet export incentive advantage.

201. See letter from Treasury Secretary Regan to the GATT Council, supra note 93.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 73-86.
203. Id.
204. Joint Committee Print, supra note 11, at 30.
205. 26 U.S.C. § 925 (West Supp. 1985). This is due to the heightened cost of using these
rules. See id. § 925(c).
206. Id. § 482. Section 482 reads as follows:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not
incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not
affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the
Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits,
or allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he
determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order
to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organizations, trades or businesses.
Id. § 482.
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Border tax adjustments are tools of fiscal policy which operate
to influence trade patterns on the basis of destination rather than
origin. 207 This "destination principle" is a rule of taxation whereby
goods are taxed according to the destination of the final consumer
as opposed to the location of the producer. 208 To understand the
significance of this distinction, it is important to realize that GA TT
has been interpreted to allow the collection and exemption of
indirect taxes on a destination basis but to disallow the exemption
of direct income taxes on an origin basis. 209 Thus, for countries that
impose indirect value added taxes (V AT), 210 as in the EC, there exists
the possibility of using indirect tax exemptions to provide export
incentives on the basis of destination. 211 Conversely, in the United
States, where only direct producer taxes are paid, 212 a direct tax
exemption used to stimulate exports would be clearly illegal under
GATT. 213
The justification provided by the GATT Council for allowing
indirect tax exemptions and disallowing direct tax exemptions is
the belief that the former are not equivalent to subsidies while the
latter are. 214 The usual rationale is that indirect taxes are allegedly
neutral in international trade as they are paid by consumers after
the price of the good has been determined competitively by the
market. 215 Therefore, they neither favor nor disadvantage producers
whose product prices have been competitively determined on the
world market. 216
Direct tax exemptions, on the other hand, are benefits which
Anninger, supra note 28, at 415.
Id.
Id. at 415-16.
VAT taxes are indirect taxes on consumption paid by the consumer, as opposed
to direct taxes which are paid on income by producers. The countries of the EC have long
used VAT taxes, along with other direct schemes.
211. By exempting certain export transactions from VAT taxes, consumers pay less
for the good and thereby will demand more.
212. Direct producer taxes are those paid on gross income.
213. Direct tax exemptions given to stimulate exports are illegal under GATT Article
XVI, as interpreted by The Working Party Agreement on Subsidies, supra note 62, unless
they are in proportion to income generated from foreign economic processes.
214. Anninger, supra note 28, at 416.
215. Id. at 416-18.
207.
208.
209.
210.

216. I~.
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accrue directly to the producer. 211 Direct tax exemptions are
disallowed because they allow producers to offer goods to the
market at a price lower than that which would be observed in the
absence of the exemption. 218 In effect, direct tax exemptions distort
market forces to favor not the most naturally competitive product,
but the product which has been rendered more competitive by
means of an artificial price reduction. 219 The conclusion, therefore,
is that banning a direct exemption and allowing a neutral indirect
exemption is consistent with the overall free trade policy of GATT. 220
Not all theorists, however, agree with this analysis.
It is now generally accepted by economists, that both direct
and indirect taxes have cost shifting effects which influence both
consumers and producers. 221 Neither operates in an isolated
fashion. 222 VAT exemptions are partially absorbed by price increases
to give exporters an added return on export sales as well as a lower
price in the world market. 223 Direct tax costs are actually shifted
forward to increase producer prices. 224 Why a distinction based on
the relative distorting effects of indirect and direct tax exemptions
has been allowed to persist in GA TT- to the disadvantage of the
United States-is the real issue of significance raised by the United
States in challenging the alleged GATT illegality of DISC. 225
It is important not to mistake this justification for DISC as
an argument that DISC is legal under GATT. GATT accepts the
indirect-direct distinction in form. 226 As an allegedly permanent
deferral, DISC is arguably GA TT illegal. DISC, however, remains
justifiable because contrary to the accepted norm that only direct
and not indirect taxes are trade distorting, EC VAT exemptions
produce similar benefits for producers and similar trade distorting

217. Id. at 416.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 418.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 416-18.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See Letter from P.S. Peter, Vice President of the General Electric Company in
Washington, D.C. to Secretary Regan, reprinted in 17 TAX NOTES (CCH) No. 10, at 770-71
(Dec. 6, 1982).
226. Reference is to the fact that GATT has been interpreted to allow indirect tax
exemptions and not direct tax exemptions. See supra notes 210-16 and accompanying text.
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effects on world trade as DISCs. 221 DISC, as a domestic corporation, is in effect theoretically equivalent to an indirect border tax
exemption scheme whereby the producer attempts to shift the
indirect exemption partially inward instead of passing it completely
on to the purchaser. 228 This type of exemption allows th~ producer
the discretion to sell at a lower price while simultaneously realizing
a greater per dollar input return than without the exemption. 229
This is the very same discretion afforded under DISC. 230 Had
the United States forced recognition of this issue within the GATT
Council, instead of abandoning it and DISC, the United States would
have had the perfect ammunition to gain either an approval of the
direct or an abandonment of the indirect exemption. The longstanding advantage of the EC could have been neutralized. Instead,
with the abandonment of DISC, any leverage the United States ever
had over a resolution of the indirect-direct controversy is currently dissipated.
The thrust of this argument is that the GATT indirect-direct
tax exemption distinction is one of form over substance. Moreover,
it is a distinction which has been used by the EC in the GATT Council to cancel a U.S. incentive which was not a new distortion to trade,
but rather a countermeasure to already existing EC practices. 231
Without the U.S. DISC, but with the EC VAT exemption system,
the EC receives a plus to trade unshared by U.S. exporters. Furthermore, by abandoning DISC, the United States has publicly relinquished a significant point of contention with the EC. In so doing,
the United States has signaled a clear retreat from longstanding
efforts to combat trade distorting practices in the EC. Thus,
although FSC may help to mend U.S. relations with the GATT Council, it is the U.S. abandonment of DISC itself which is perhaps the
most significant signal to come from the controversy.

D. FSC AND AMERICAN BUSINESS
A major debate in the U.S. business community over the enactment of FSC is the size of the actual credit under FSC as compared
227. Letter from Peter to Regan, supra note 225.
228. Anninger, supra note 28, at 416-18.
229. Id.
230. Because DISC is a tax incentive to producers which operates in the first instance
to lower the effective tax rate on export transactions, producers can either lower prices
by the amount of the subsidy, increase per dollar return by the amount of the subsidy or
any combination of the two. This is the same result as when a producer receives a VAT
exemption or rebate.
231. See letter from Peter to Regan, supra note 225.
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to DISC. In this regard, because FSC is designed to accommodate
large and small exporters differently, the analysis below will take
a similar tact.
1.

Probable Effects of FSC on Large Exporters

Under DISC and FSC, the actual size of a firm's benefit depends
on the fraction of its total income that can be allocated to the
subsidiary, 232 as well as the fraction of export income that is exempt
from federal taxation. 233 Under DISC, it is estimated that a firm
can defer the payment of federal taxes on somewhere between 17%
and 33% of its income. 234 If the rate of taxation is assumed to be
46%, this range of estimates translates into a maximum effective
tax rate of 38.2% to a minimum of 30.80/o. 235 Considering FSC, on
the other hand, it can be estimated that an individual firm with
an FSC could exempt a minimum of 17% and a maximum of 74%
of its income from U.S. taxation. 236
It is likely, however, that few firms will fall within the upper
portion of this range of estimates.237 Under the FSC rules, only firms
with very low profit margins would be able to exempt a portion
of income in the upper end of this range. 238 Indeed, judging by the
average profit margin reported for DISC-utilizing manufacturing
firms in 1981,239 most firms using FSCs would probably be in the
lower end of this range. 240 This is the portion of the range that coincides with parallel figures calculated for the DISC provisions. 2403
It appears, then, that while some firms with FSCs might be able
to receive larger tax exemptions under FSC, for most larger firms
the tax benefit should be the same.
The equality of benefit under both systems, however, is only
guaranteed where the FSC is located in a low tax country. 241 Due
232. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30; 125-32.
233. Id.
234. Brumbaugh, Effect of Administration FSC Proposal on Export Firms, Congressional
Research Service, reprinted in 21 TAX NOTES (CCHl No. 3, at 255 (Oct. 17, 1983).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. 1983 TREASURY REPORT ON DISC, supra note 198.
240. Brumbaugh, supra note 234.
240a. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
241. The argument here is that while DISC is incorporated in the United States and
pays no taxes itself, FSC is incorporated abroad and pays foreign taxes. Thus any net benefit
would have to include foreign tax liability. A move to increase the level of benefit under
FSC, therefore, would be to incorporate in a country with a low corporate income tax rate.
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to foreign incorporation, 242 foreign taxes become a major force in
dampening the benefits under this proposal as compared with
DISC. 243 Moreover, without the foreign tax credit, all foreign taxes
are fully borne by the FSC and its parent, and cannot be offset
against a firm's U.S. tax liability. 244 In cases of high foreign tax rates,
it may be more profitable to set up shop abroad and receive the
100% tax deferral accorded foreign subsidiaries. Similarly, those
businesses which can feasibly set up FSCs in tax haven countries
will be inclined to do so, rekindling flames under this hotly debated
issue.
Administrative costs of setting up offshore are a second
dampening effect which will eat into the benefit an FSC can effectively provide compared to DISC. 245 In a high volume, low profit
business, even slight administrative costs may be too much for the
corporation to afford in relation to the benefits of FSC. 246 Production abroad may be the only answer in such cases.._ with a resulting
loss of jobs and investment at home.
Thus, although the proposal in itself provides comparable
tax benefits to DISC, due to the complication of now dealing with
incorporation abroad, foreign administrative costs and an added
layer of taxation, many firms may find FSC an incentive to produce abroad and give up exporting domestically produced products
all together. Such results would clearly be contrary to any of the
purposes for which DISC was created: increased employment, U.S.
investment or exports. 247
2.

Probable Effects of FSC on Small Exporters

As discussed above, the FSC proposal contains two exceptions
that apply to exporting firms that have gross receipts below acertain level. 248 The first exception provides that if a company
establishes an FSC that generates gross receipts of five million
dollars or less, it need not satisfy the foreign presence
242. 26 U.S.C. § 922(aXl)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1985).
243. See supra note 241.
244. 26 U.S.C. § 901(h) (West Supp. 1985). See id. § 902.
245. Under DISC, no substance or specific economic processes are required. DISC is
a paper corporation. FSC, on the other hand, has specific foreign presence and economic
process requirements. See id. §§ 992, 924(b) & (c), & (e). See also text accompanying notes
101-24.
246. Brumbaugh, supra note 234.
247. See Joint Committee Print, supra note 11, at 3.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 149-60.
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requirements. 249 For firms that have substantially less than five
million dollars in gross receipts, the utilization of this provision may
result in a somewhat smaller tax benefit than that received under
DISC. 250
The second exception is for DISCs with ten million dollars or
less in income. 251 These "small DISCs" become exempt from the incremental rules that link the DISC benefit with annual increases
in export sales. 252 Small DISCs are able to exempt somewhere
between 21.3% and 42.5% of their income from taxation based on
the DISC rules for income allocation and the portion of a DISC's
income that can be retained tax-exempt. 253
Under the small FSC provisions, it is important to note that
the size of the probable tax exemption would not be directly affected by the relaxed foreign economic processes requirements. 254
The FSC exemption for most of these firms, as with other FSCs,
would amount to the same 17 to 74% range estimated for larger
FSCs. 255 ·Thus, those that are eligible for small fSC status would
receive approximately the same tax benefit as a large FSC or DISC.
The critical advantage, therefore, for firms that qualify for the small
FSC exception is the cost benefit of not having the same economic
process requirements to dampen the overall level of benefit. 256
For firms that elect to operate as small DISCs, there is another
element to contend with - one which was not part of the original
DISC program. Although none of the small DISC's income is deemed
distributed, there is an added interest charge on the deferred
amount. 257 The actual tax liability of these small DISCs would then
be the shareholder's taxes on that share of combined corporate
income not allocated to the DISC, the taxes on any voluntary distributions from the DISC, and now the added interest charge.
The size of the tax benefit for interest charge DISCs will vary
depending on the interest rate of Treasury Bills at a given time. 258

249.
158-60.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

26 U.S.C. § 924(bX2)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1985). See supra text accompanying notes
Brumbaugh, supra note 234.
26 U.S.C. § 995(bXll(E) (West Supp. 1985).
1984 Tax Conference Report, supra note 113, at H6512, section 802(a)(l).
Brumbaugh, supra note 234.
Id.
Id.
Id.
26 U.S.C. § 995(f) (West Supp. 1985).
Id.
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Thus, to estimate a precise level of tax benefit is not possible.
However, it is arguable that new-DISC benefits, with the interest
charge, would be smaller. 259 This is because as treasury bill rates
approach the prevailing market rate of interest, any return received
on invested DISC deferred income will be theoretically absorbed
more and more by the interest charge. 260 Thus, new DISCs may be
less of a small exporter's dream than appears on the surface.

V. CONCLUSION
This Note began by calling FSC a truly ironic solution to the
current DISC controversy. To understand the nature of this claim,
it is useful to once again briefly trace the history of the DISC
controversy.
Originally, DISC was set up to aid a poor U.S. balance of
payments and remove taxes as a factor which promoted overseas
investment. 261 The plan, however, had the positive side effect of partially neutralizing two structural, yet GATT legal, distortions contained in EC tax systems which favored the competitiveness of
EC exports. First was the export incentive created by the indirect
tax exemption, such as the European VAT. 262 Second was the way
EC tax laws allowed multinational corporations to beneficially
manipulate transfer prices in order to lower the effective tax rate
on world wide corporate income. 263
However, because DISC was a domestic corporation which
received a direct tax benefit calculated in relation to exports, the
EC seized the opportunity to defeat DISC on an argument of GATT
illegal form. This argument based on form insulated the EC from
having to address the substance of the direct-indirect tax and
transfer pricing controversies DISC so clearly brought to the fore. 264
Thus, the first level of the paradox: while DISC's replacement,
FSC, is in form arguably GATT legal, in substance the proposal fails
to address the clear distorting effects of the EC tax systems.
Similarly, instead of resulting in enforcement of arm's-length pricing
on both sides of the Atlantic, the proposal merely gives U.S. producers a costly, unilateral mandate to seek arm's-length standards.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Brumbaugh, supra note 234.
Id.
See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 208-35 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 73-86 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 208-32 and accompanying text.
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As a result, trade will be left in an even more distorted position
than under DISC-all in the name of GATT and freer trade.
The reason for this outcome is the second level of the paradox.
In an effort to keep the DISC-GA TT legality issue from spilling
over into other U.S.-EC discussions, the U.S. Congress, in enacting
FSC, blanketed international political considerations over the concerns of the businessmen who actually face the distortions of the
EC's tax systems. The result is a replacement that is less favorable
than DISC to the large and small businessman, that arguably exports jobs, and may even once again promote foreign investment. 265
In the long run, these trampled constituencies have no way to regain
lost ground but to unite behind even greater subsidies or protection than DISC. Whereas DISC should have been a negotiating chip
to avert and rectify the long run fears of business about the structural bias of the European systems, the watered down FSC, while
representing a short run fix to the U.S.-EC political malaise, may
eventually cause an even greater upheaval in the American business
community.

David James Cichanowicz
265. See supra notes 232-60 and accompanying text.
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